


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(71)



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Report

Weekly Report

Prepared Exclusively for the  
Senior Interdepartmental Group

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44

28 November 1966

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2. JORDAN

Although anti-Husayn demonstrations have subsided, the situation remains dangerous.

Palestinian antagonism toward the regime continues to be fueled by the Cairo-based Palestine Liberation Organization as well as the Cairo and Damascus press. Much of this propaganda now openly attacks Husayn, whereas it initially concentrated on Prime Minister Tal. Husayn probably will replace Tal in an effort to appease the dissidents, but this is unlikely to occur soon since it would appear to be too hasty a response to popular pressure.

Neither the UN Security Council's censure of Israel nor the acceleration of US arms aid to Jordan appears to have had much effect. The arms aid does not seem to have been dramatic enough in terms of hardware and timing to impress the King, and the Palestinian demonstrators have been less interested in punishing Israel than in venting their antipathy toward the government.

Conspirators against Husayn within the army are still active and can be expected to try to make the most of the present turmoil. Whether this will significantly improve their prospects is uncertain. Last week, the Jordanians captured the first arms shipment from Syria to terrorist depots in Jordan since the 13 November Israeli raid. This development suggests that the Syrians and the terrorists have not been deterred from further terrorist operations against Israel; they may also be preparing for action against Husayn. Jordanian intelligence continues to receive reports pointing to attempts to assassinate the King. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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#### 4. SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA

The flow of Soviet arms into Algeria has caused Morocco and Tunisia to continue to press the US for arms.

Premier Boumediene disclaims any aggressive intentions; nevertheless, the number and sophistication of incoming weapons disturb his neighbors. This month at least three Soviet ships have delivered artillery, radar equipment, and ammunition. Soviet aircraft delivered late last month brought Algeria's inventory to 27 IL-28 jet light bombers and 94 MIG fighters. Substantial numbers of Algerians are receiving military training in the USSR and several hundred Soviet instructors are conducting training in Algeria.

Algerian military capabilities are limited by a shortage of skilled technicians, a lack of operational experience with large units, and inexperience in air-ground tactical cooperation. The logistic system is not up to sustained combat operations. The Soviet training program should, however, begin to overcome these deficiencies in a year or two.

Internal political considerations would probably now inhibit aggressive action by the Algerian Army. Its officers disagree on political ideology and orientation, and their backgrounds tend to divide them into such groups as former maquisards, French-trained professionals, and Soviet-trained junior officers. Furthermore, the army is increasingly being saddled with civil administrative chores.


Algeria has serious border disputes with both Tunisia and Morocco and minor incidents along both borders sustain tensions. Algeria's nationalization of mines in the undefined border area south of Morocco, together with its support for Spain over Spanish Sahara, causes friction with Morocco. Boumediene, however, recently has taken steps to improve relations with Tunisia. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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# SINO - BURMESE BORDER AREA



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5. TAIWAN - BURMA - COMMUNIST CHINA

Chinese Nationalist plans to increase the activity of irregular forces in the Burma-China border area, if carried out, could severely strain US-Burmese relations.

Taipei military planners envisage a 5,000-man force to be built up in two or three years using existing groups augmented by refugees. The initial mission of the force would be intelligence collection and harassment of Yunnan Province. A high-level Nationalist team is preparing to go to the border area to investigate prospects for this plan.

Military and diplomatic pressure has twice forced the evacuation of irregulars to Taiwan. In 1954, about 7,000 of the 15,000 KMT troops who retreated to Burma after the Communist take-over in China were evacuated. Nationalist attempts in 1960 to build up the irregulars by airlifting 1,200 Special Forces troops and supplies were defeated by Chinese Communist and Burmese forces. About 3,500 men were subsequently repatriated to Taiwan, but Taipei has continued to give some support to the remnants.

Taipei would face no insurmountable logistic problems in providing a new irregular force with officers and arms. Last August two arms shipments were airlifted to Luang Prabang and then packed overland through Thailand. Taipei has many large long-range aircraft, and a new airstrip on Pratas Island reduces the air distance to the border area by 250 miles.

Bangkok, in the past, has been concerned about the Nationalists' lack of control over the irregulars. In late 1965, however, the Thais and Nationalists concluded an agreement for intelligence operations into Southwest China.

Past irregular raids into Yunnan succeeded only in provoking strong reaction from the Burmese, who hold the US responsible for Taiwan's actions. (SECRET) (Map)

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